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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE HOME VIDEOTAPING CONTROVERSY: ACHIEVING A
DELICATE BALANCE BETWEEN COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO NEW
ENTERTAINMENT TECHNOLOGY
Sony Corporationof America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
104 S. Ct. 774 (1984)
The popular video tape recorder, known as the Betamax, enables millions of consumers to daily record copyrighted television
broadcasts for later viewing on cassettes.' Shortly after its introduction to the public, the Betamax became the subject of a prolonged lawsuit which has become one of the most publicized and
significant cases in the history of copyright law. The plaintiff copyright owners, Universal City Studios and Walt Disney productions,
maintained that the corporate defendants,' by encouraging the use
of home videotaping of copyrighted material, were liable for contributory infringement. The defendants contended that home videotaping for private use was not copyright infringement, and that
even if it were, they could not be held liable on a theory of vicarious liability. The District Court for the Central District of California concluded that private videotaping in homes did not constitute
copyright infringement.3 The district court insisted that, even if
infringement had occurred, the defendants could not be held vicariously liable because the video tape recorder (VTR) was a staple
1. Before the introduction of the Sony Betamax, videotaping of televised broadcasts
was a complicated procedure that was not widely used by the public. Encyclopedia Britannica Ed. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1161 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). Today, more than three
million American homes have VTR's. 127 CoNG. Rzc. S11,810 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1981)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini). By 1990, according to estimates by industry analysts, videotape recorders will be in 40 million homes. Hollywood and the Home Videotapers, 70 NAlIONS Bus. 40 (1982).
2. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429 (1979). The defendants named in the infringement action were the manufacturers, distributors, retailers
and advertisers of the Sony Betamax VTR. Id. at 432. The plaintiff did not seek relief
against any individual home users. A consumer of the Betamax was named in the complaint
against whom the plaintiffs waived any claim for damages or costs. Id. at 437.
3. Id. at 442.
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article of commerce.'
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unanimously reversed, holding that home videotaping for private use constituted
infringement and not fair use. The court of appeals also held the
defendants liable for contributory infringement. e In overturning
that decision, the sharply divided Supreme Court held that: 1) private, noncommercial home VTR time-shifting by consumers is legitimate fair use and does not violate federal copyright law; and 2)
the manufacture and sale of VTR's to the general public does not
constitute contributory infringement of the copyrights in televised
programs. Sony Corporationof America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc. 104 S.Ct. 774 (1984).
A motion picture or television producer is currently only paid
when his work is shown in theaters, on television and when it is
sold as a prerecorded videocassette. When the owner of a Betamax
records a televised broadcast on a blank cassette and later shows it
to a gathering of his friends, the producer receives nothing. The
home videotaping controversy was born when Universal Studios
and Disney Productions set out to protect their valuable copyrights from infringement by this type of use.
The district court rejected the plaintiff copyright owners' plea
for protection and entered judgment for the defendants.' In holding that there had been no infringement, the district court reasoned that the legislative history of the Copyright Act s demonstrated an implied exemption for videotaping.* The trial court also
held that home videotaping constitutes fair use under section 107
of the Copyright Act.10 The court's opinion can fairly be characterized as favoring public access to technological advances in the entertainment field over the copyright owner's right to protection.
The Ninth Circuit's decision placed primary emphasis on protecting the copyright owner's right to "control the cost of and ac4.

Id. at 461.

5.

Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d at 963, 969 (9th Cir.

1981).
6.

Id. at 976.

7. 480 F. Supp. at 442.
8. Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§101-810 (1982).
9. 480 F. Supp. at 444-46. The trial court found that the Copyright Act's recognition
of an exemption for the home taping of audio recordings was sufficiently analogous to create

an implied exemption.
10. Id. at 456. Section 107 is a restatement of the judicial doctrine of fair use which
allows others to make reasonable use of copyrighted material without the owner's consent.
17 U.S.C. §107 (1982).
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cess to his novelty."'" The court of appeals first focused on the
constitutional philosophy underlying our copyright scheme, which
is to promote public access to artistic works by offering economic
incentives to creative individuals." The court then proceeded to
reverse the trial court's holdings on the legislative implied exemption," fair use' 4 and contributory infringement" issues.
On remanding the case to the district court, the court of appeals stressed that, despite inherent difficulties, relief must be afforded plaintiffs whose copyrights have been infringed. 6 The court
suggested that, since great public harm would result from a permanent injunction, an acceptable resolution may be to create a compulsory licensing scheme which provides for reasonable royalty
payments.' 7 Thus, the court of appeals sought a balanced resolution to the controversy which would protect copyright owners'
rights while not standing in the way of technological advances.
The Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the court of appeals by a narrow 5-4 margin. The closeness of the vote illustrates
the evident difficulty the controversy has given the Court for more
than a year."s This difficulty may well have stemmed from the fact
that the case presented a "unique" request for relief which required the Justices to apply old law to new technology." By focusing on public access concerns rather than copyright owners' expectations, the Court dramatically broadened the fair use doctrine to
include the reproduction of copyrighted material, for the mere convenience of the ordinary user, at the copyright owner's expense.
Speaking through Justice Stevens, 0 the majority first noted
that since its inception, the development of copyright law has re11. 659 F.2d at 965.
12. Id. The Constitution enables Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of... useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
13. 659 F.2d at 967-69, 977.
14. Id. at 969-74, 977. The court did affirm, however, a portion of the lower court's
opinion holding the retail stores' demonstration copying to be fair use. Id. at 976.
15. Id. at 974-76, 977.
16. Id. at 976.

17. Id.
18. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 457 U.S. 1116 (1982), and the case was first argued in January of 1983. 51
U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1983). After failing to reach a decision last term, the Court
ordered reargument. 103 S. Ct. 3568 (1983).
19. Nowhere within the federal copyright statute is home videotaping specifically
mentioned. 17 U.S.C. §§101-810 (1982).
20. Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, White
and O'Connor. 104 S. Ct. 774, 777 (1984).
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sponded to the many changes brought on by technological advancement.2' The Court recalled that Congress has fashioned the
necessary rules as new technological developments have occurred
in this country." Moreover, Justice Stevens indicated that
"[s]ound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
market for copyrighted materials."'" When Congress has not
plainly indicated the path in a technological controversy, the Court
must remain "circumspect in construing the scope of rights created
by a legislative enactment which never contemplated such a
calculus of interests.""
Justice Stevens next examined the issue of contributory infringement, stating that there is no express provision in the Copyright Act that renders one liable for an infringement committed by
another."5 He acknowledged the fact that vicarious liability and the
concept of contributory infringement do, however, pervade all areas of the law." He, therefore, concluded that the absence of express statutory language in the copyright law does not prevent the
7
imposition of liability for contributory infringements.1
While addressing the contributory infringement issue, the majority separated supplying the "means" to accomplish an infringing
activity from the "end" of copyright infringement. The Court's
"ends" - "means" analysis served to discredit the copyright decision, Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers," on which the respondents
had placed their principal reliance. In Kalem, the Court held a
producer liable for the sale of his unauthorized film dramatization
of a popular copyrighted book to jobbers, who later arranged for
the commercial exhibition of the motion picture.' 9
The majority distinguished Kalem by noting that the producer
in that case was liable because he not only supplied the "means" to
0 In
accomplish the infringing activity, but also the work itself.3
contrast, Sony does not supply its Betamax customers with the
copyrighted works." The Court found it significant that the range
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 782-83.
Id. at 783.
Id.
ICL
Id. at 785.

Id.
Id.
222 U.S. 55 (1911).
Id. at 63.
104 S.Ct. at 786.
Id. at 786-87. "The only contact between Sony and the users of the Betamax...
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was more extensive than that
of the potential use of the Betamax
32
Kalem.
in
involved
use
the
of
If the petitioners are to be held liable for contributory infringement, Justice Stevens argued, it must rest on the theory that
they sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that
their customers might use the Betamax to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material.3 3 While there is no copyright law precedent on such a theory of vicarious liability, the Court suggested
that sn analogy to the patent laws is appropriate.3
The patent statute, the Court observed, prohibits the knowing
sale of a component especially made for use with a particular patent.3 However, the Patent Code expressly provides that the sale of
a "staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use"3 6 is not contributory infringement.3 Noting
that one potential use of the Betamax is private time-shifting in
the home, the majority concluded that the Betamax is capable of
substantial noninfringing uses. s
To bolster this conclusion, the Court discussed the findings of
the district court and the fair use doctrine. The Court indicated
that there are two types of time-shifting: authorized and unauthorized, neither of which copyright owners can prevent.3 '
In addressing authorized time-shifting, the Court found it significant that district court testimony, from representatives of professional sports leagues and public broadcasting authorities, indicated no objection to private home time-shifting.4 0 The majority
occurred at the moment of sale." Id.
32. Id. at 786.
33. Id. at 787.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 788.
36. Under the staple article of commerce doctrine, a manufacturer or retailer of an
item, such as a typewriter or camera, is not liable for any infringing uses by consumers if the
item is "suitable for substantial noninfringing use." Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §271(c) (1976).
Thus, the staple article of commerce doctrine has carved a significant exception in contributory infringement cases arising under patent law. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.,
448 U.S. 176, 198 (1980). Not to permit the exception would "block the wheels of commerce." Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912), overruled on other grounds, Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917). The application of
this patent law doctrine to the field of copyright law is fraught with difficulty. 104 S. Ct. at
814. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §12.04(A) at 12-41 (1983).
37. 104 S. Ct. at 788.
38. Id. at 789. Time-shifting is the recording of a televised program in order to view it
once at a later and more convenient time. Id. at 778.
39. Id. at 789.
40. Id. at 790 nn.24-27. Testimony was provided by representatives from the baseball,
football, basketball and hockey leagues. Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion, pointed
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regarded these tenuous findings as conclusive evidence that many
copyright owners authorize private time-shifting of their programs
because it serves to enlarge their total viewing audience.4 The
Court concluded that the respondents had no right to prevent
other copyright owners from authorizing time-shifting for their
programs.4 '
Turning to the extent that home videotaping involves unauthorized time-shifting, the Court asserted that such activity is protected under the fair use doctrine.' The Court then proceeded to
apply an "equitable rule of reason" analysis with an examination
of the four factors set forth in section 107 of the Copyright Act.4

The Court concluded tht each factor demonstrated that home
time-shifting is fair use. "!

In construing the first factor, "the-purpose and character of
the use," the majority focused once again on the findings of the
district court to determine the commercial or nonprofit nature of
Betamax use. The Court concluded that the district court findings
established that time-shifting for private home 46viewing must be
classified as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity.

out that the survey conducted by Sony indicates that only 7.3 percent of all videotaping use
is for the recording of sports events. Justice Blackmun concluded that the amount of timeshifting that has been authorized by the various sport leagues is not substantial. Id. at 816
n.45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The only witness at trial who actually authorized the taping
of his own copyrighted program was Fred Rogers. The Court gives no evidence, however, on
to what extent these television programs, which are made for children, are being videotaped.
In addition, testimony was offered by: the station manager of a Los Angeles educational
station; broadcasting authorities from New York and New Jersey; and representatives from
the National Collegiate Athletic Association and the National Religious Broadcasters Association. It is interesting to note that one of the witnesses specifically declined to approve
VTR use for anything other than educational purposes. Id. at 790 n.26.
41. Id. at 791.
42. Id. at 789.
43. Id. Fair use of a copyrighted work can be obtained "for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research." 17 U.S.C. §107 (1982). Traditionally, the fair use doctrine has never ventured beyond the realm of these productive uses. The Court, in stretching the doctrine to
include an unproductive use, departs from this tradition.
44. 17 U.S.C. §107 (1982). The Act provides that the determination, of whether or not
the use of a work is fair, must include an examination of the following four factors:
1) the purpose and character of the use, including whiether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
45. 104 S. Ct. at 795.
46. Id. at 792.
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The next two statutory factors were only given a cursory examination by the Court. In its discussion of the second factor, "the
nature of the copyrighted work," the Court found it relevant that
the nature of a televised copyrighted program is one that is
presented to the public free of charge. 7 With regard to the third
factor, "the amount and substantiality of the portion used," the
majority did acknowledge that copyrighted works are being reproduced in their entirety by VTR owners.4 8 The Court, however,
maintained that the third factor does not have its usual effect of
precluding a finding of fair use because of the distinctive nature of
the free television broadcasts.4
The Court was more thorough in its analysis of the fourth factor, "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work." The Court observed that there must be a
showing "by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists."5 Thus, the majority placed
the difficult burden of proving harm on the copyright owners. The
Court, looking to the district court's opinion for support, concluded that the respondents had failed to carry their burden with
regard to demonstrating the likelihood of harm from the home
time-shifting of their programs. 1 Moreover, the Court asserted
that home time-shifting benefits society because it expands public
access to free television programs. 2 The Court viewed this public
access argument as supportive of its finding that home time-shifting, although unauthorized, is still fair use.5
The majority concluded by acknowledging that Congress must
ultimately decide whether changes are to be made in the copyright
statute to deal with new technology." The Court insisted that "it
is not our job to apply laws that have not yet been written." '
Four Justices dissented in an opinion, written by Justice
Blackmun, 65 which accused the majority of evading the difficult
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 792-93.
50. Id. at 793.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 795.
53. Id. at 789.
54. Id. at 796.
55. Id.
56. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The opinion was joined by Justices Marshall, Powell and Rehnquist. The organization and length of the dissenting opinion suggested to some
commentators that it had originally been the majority opinion. N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1984, at
42, col. 2.
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new issues that are arising in the area of copyright law by taking
refuge in the Court's "consistent deference to Congress. '"' Justice
Blackmun maintained that an examination of the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act indicated that Congress intended to
cover all new technologies, even though they had not been specifically mentioned within the four corners of the statute." The dissenting opinion next examined the explicit references to private
use in the Copyright Act, noting that these limitations would be
meaningless if a copy of an entire work could be made for any individual's private use. 5 ' Moreover, Justice Blackmun made it clear
that he deemed inappropriate the district court's reliance on the
legislative history of a 1971 amendment to the Copyright Act in
creating an implied exemption for private home recording. 0 Thus,
Justice Blackmun concluded that home videotaping constituted an
infringement for which there was no express or implied exemption
under the Copyright Act.
Justice Blackmun then turned to a consideration of the fair
use doctrine, "the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright." 1 In their examination of the fair use doctrine, the dissenters engaged in a "productive" versus "ordinary" use analysis."'
Justice Blackmun pointed out the critical difference between the
scholar, who makes use of a copyrighted work to ultimately benefit
society, and the ordinary user, who only benefits himself at the expense of the copyright owner." Justice Blackmun found it significant that he could cite "no case in which the reproduction of a
copyrighted work for the sole benefit of the user has been held to
be fair use."" In the dissenters' view, a video tape recording is an
57. 104 S. Ct. at 797.
6& Id. at 805 n.26.
59. Id. at 800-03. Justice Blackmun focused on the detailed library photocopying provisions of 1108 to demonstrate that Congress has made explicit special exemptions for private use. Id. at 803.
60. Id. The 1971 Amendment to the 1909 Copyright Act did not create an implied
exemption for VTR use, according to Justice Blackmun, because it was addressed to the
different problem posed by the commercial piracy of sound recordings. Id.
61. Id. at 806.
62. Id. at 806-09. A productive use can be defined as a use that serves a function other
than the one that the copyright owner originally intended for copies of his work. Since it
does not hinder the owner's expectations of profits, a productive use of a work invokes the
fair use doctrine. 3 Nnimiu ON COPYRIGHT §13.05(A) at 13-59, 13-67 (1983). In contrast, an
ordinary or intrinsic use is one that serves the same function as the owner intended for the
work and constitutes infringement because it upsets the copyright owner's proper expectations of economic reward. L SBLrmT~, ExEMPTIONS AN FaR UsE IN COPYIGHT 24 (1978).
63. 104 S. Ct. at 807. The crucial difference between a scholar and the ordinary user is
that the scholar's work "produces external benefits from which everyone profits." Id.
64. Id. at 80&
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ordinary rather than productive use of copyrighted material which
creates no public benefit sufficient to justify the limitation of a
copyright owner's exclusive "bundle of rights" under section 106 of
the Copyright Act."5
The dissent also parted company with the Court over the issue
of contributory infringement. Justice Blackmun makes two basic
objections to the majority's reasoning that the respondents are not
liable for contributory infringement. His first objection is that the
doctrine of contributory infringement can be imposed even when
there is no direct contact between the defendant and the infringer." This objection draws analogies to Gershwin Publishing
Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.,7 the "dance hall"
cases," and Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories,Inc."
Relying on these precedents, Justice Blackmun argued that Sony
should be held accountable for contributory infringement because
of its knowledge that the Betamax was intended for infringing
70

uses.

Justice Blackmun's second objection was to the Court's willingness to absolve Sony from liability based on a finding that the
Betamax was capable of substantial noninfringing use. He questioned the wisdom of applying the staple article of commerce doctrine, from patent law, to copyright cases. 1 Although Justice
Blackmun conceded that the concerns addressed by the staple article of commerce doctrine are similar to those found in the area of
65. Id. "Section 106 enumerates five fundamental and exclusive rights - the presentday expression of the traditional 'bundle of rights' comprising copyright." Ladd, Home Recording and Reproduction of Protected Works, 68 A.B.A. J. 42, 43 (1982). The copyright
owner, under section 106, is granted the exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, distribution of copies and phonorecords, performance and display. 17 U.S.C. §106 (1982).
66. 104 S. Ct. at 812.
67. 443 F.2d 1159 (3rd Cir. 1971). The Gershwin case involved a concert promoter who
was held liable for contributory infringement even though he had no direct contact with the
infringing performers. The court held that the promoter's "knowledge of the infringing activity was sufficient to render him liable for contributory infringement." Id. at 1162.
68. In a series of judicial opinions, often referred to as the "dance hall" cases, owners
of entertainment establishments have been held liable for unauthorized performances on
their premises on the theory that they had constructive knowledge of the infringing activity.
See, e.g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Assn., Inc.,
554 F.2d 1213 (1st Cir. 1977); Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36
F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929); M. Whitmark & Sons v. Tremont Social and Athletic Club, 188 F.
Supp. 787 (D. Mass. 1960).
69. 456 U.S. 844 (1982). Addressing the question of contributory trademark infringement, the Inwood Court concluded that liability could be imposed on a manufacturer who
"suggested, even by implication" that a retailer engage in infringing activity, Id. at 851.
70. 104 S. Ct. at 813.
71. Id. at 814.
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copyright law, ' he argued that a significant portion of the product's use must be noninfringing in order to preclude the imposition
of contributory liability." If all of a product's use is infringing,
Justice Blackmun pointed out, then there is no public benefit sufficient to warrant releasing the manufacturers and sellers of the
product from liability. 74 Justice Blackmun observed that the case
should have been remanded to the district court for the resolution
of the factual question regarding the
precise proportion of VTR
5
use that is to be deemed infringing.'
The dissent concluded by taking the Court to task for its holding that unauthorized time-shifting is fair use. Justice Blackmun
accused the majority of ignoring the plain language of section 107,
which addresses itself only to the productive uses of copyrighted
materiaL"6 The dissent then criticized the Court's confident characterization of time-shifting as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity
under section 107(1).7 Again, Justice Blackmun emphasized the
productive use distinction by noting that "time-shifting is noncommercial in the same sense that stealing jewelry and wearing it instead of reselling it - is noncommercial.""8
This logical deduction completed, the dissent went on to analyze the remaining three factors of section 107. As for the second
factor, Justice Blackmun reasoned that since informational programs contribute more towards furthering productive uses by
others, they deserve a higher degree of protection than entertainment programs. 7" He viewed the third factor as intended only to
allow individuals to copy small portions of a copyrighted work for
productive use." Since VTR owners record the entire copyrighted
work, Justice Blackmun concluded that the third factor alone may
in this instance be sufficient to prevent a finding of fair use."1
In addressing the harm criterion of section 107, the dissent
72. I.
7& Id.
74. Id. "(T]he manufacturer of such a product contributes to the infringing activities
of others and profits directly thereby, while providing no benefit to the public sufficient to

justify the infringement." Id.
75. Id. at 815.
76. Id. at 816. See supra note 43.
77. 104 S.Ct. at 816-17.
78. Id. (quoting Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing before Subcomm. on

Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sees. 1250 (1982) (memorandum of Prof. Laurence H. Tribe)).
79. Id. at 817.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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shifted the burden of proof from the copyright owner to the infringer. In order to avoid liability, according to Justice Blackmun,

the infringer must demonstrate that he has not impaired the copyright owner's ability to receive compensation for his work."2 Justice

Blackmun stressed that the statute calls for an examination of the
harm to the potential market, as opposed to the present market,
for the copyrighted work. 3 The dissenting Justices concluded that

"time-shifting does have a substantial adverse effect upon the 'potential market' for the Studios' copyrighted works.""
The Supreme Court's analysis of the home videotaping controversy sought a resolution that would not stand in the way of technological advancement. In that respect, the majority's opinion can
be characterized as favoring increased public access to copyrighted
works over the copyright owner's rights of control and compensation.8 5 The court of appeals, by contrast, adopted a more literal
interpretation of the Copyright Act by placing primary emphasis
on protecting copyright owners' rights rather than on public access

concerns." The most equitable balance between copyright protection and increased public access can be achieved with the creation
of a compulsory licensing scheme which provides for reasonable
royalty payments.8 7 Other countries have already imposed such
royalty systems." Such a licensing scheme, entitled the "Home Recording Act of 1983," received consideration by Congress, but was

placed on a "back burner." 8'
82. Id. at 811.
83. Id. at 817-18.
84. Id. at 811.
85. Id. at 795. "[T]o the extent that time-shifting expands public access to freely
broadcast television programs, it yields societal benefits." The Court conceded that "the
public interest in making television broadcasting more available... is not unlimited. But it
supports an interpretation of the concept of 'fair use' that requires the copyright holder to
demonstrate some likelihood of harm" before he may receive protection under the federal
copyright law. Id.
86. 659 F.2d at 976. "The difficulty of fashioning relief cannot... dissuade the federal courts from affording appropriate relief to those whose rights have been infringed." Id.
87. The court of appeals noted that "when great public injury would result from an
injunction, a court could award damages or a continuing royalty." Id. See also 3 NIMMR ON
CoPYRGr §13.05(E)(4)(e) at 13-91 (1982).

88. Federal Act on Copyright in Works of Literature and Art and on Related Rights
(Austria), §42(5)-(7) and An Act dealing with Copyright and Related Rights (Germany), art.
53(5), reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAws AND TRzATIES OF To WORLD (UNESCO/BNA 1982)
(English translation). Under the German law, a copyright owner does not need to demonstrate significant economic harm before receiving protection under the copyright law. Ladd,
Home Recording and Reproduction of Protected Works, 68 A.B.A. J. 42, 45 (1982).
89. S.31, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. Rzc. S254-61 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983) and
H.R. 1030, 98th Cong., 1st Seas., 129 CONG. REc. H197-200 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1983). Under
the Home Recording Act of 1983, manufacturers and importers of video and audio recorders
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The most fundamental question raised by the home videotaping controversy is whether copyright owners must now demonstrate economic harm in order to receive copyright protection for
their creative works. The analytical framework for answering that
question was set forth in two recent speeches by David Ladd, the
Register of Copyrights." Mr. Ladd maintained that there is presently no requirement under our copyright system that the copyright owner must prove economic harm in order to demonstrate
infringement."1 He asserts that underlying the concept of harm
theory "is a more sinister point of view: the idea that copyright is
mere privilege."" The limitation, triggered by the concept of harm,
and blank tapes would be required to pay a royalty fee to copyright owners under a compulsory licensing scheme. The royalty fees would be set by voluntary negotiation of the affected
parties or, if that fails, by means of binding arbitration under the guidance of the Register
of Copyrights. Individuals who make an audio or video recording of a copyrighted work
would be exempt from liability provided that the recorded tape is for the private use of that
individual or members of his family.
It is important to recognize that the Home Recording Act would also be applicable to
sound recordings. This is in response to reports from the record industry of losses in record
sales amounting to about 900 million dollars each year because of home taping. 129 CONG.
Rzc. .H198 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1983) (statement by Rep. Edwards). Almost three-fifths of
American households own a tape recorder with approximately 20 million new purchases
each year. Recent survey results reveal that Americans tape the equivalent of 564 million
albums of music each year and at least 84 percent of blank tapes are used for this purpose.
Need for Home Recording Legislation Debated before Senate Subcommittee, 27 PAT.
TimR UmA & Cop ioirr J. (BNA) 8 (1983).
The imposition of royalty fees should not seriously affect prices for consumers because
the pressures of competition in the booming audio and video recording industries have
brought the market prices to new lows. For example, when the trial court first considered
the Betamax controversy the cost of a video tape recorder was in the $875 to $1000 range.
480 F. Supp. at 435. Today, units can be purchased for under $400. Even Sony Can't Avoid
the Price War in VCR'#, 2755 Bus. WL- 33, 34 (1982).
Another bill, the Consumer Video Sales/Rental Amendment of 1983, was introduced to
establish a commercial lending right for copyright owners which would enable them to share
in the revenues produced in the prerecorded videocassette rental market. Under this
Amendment, prerecorded videocassettes may not be rented without the prior authorization
of the copyright owner. S.33, 98th Cong., 1st Sees., 129 CONG. Rzc. S254-61 (daily ed. Jan.
26, 1983). A simila bill, the Record Rental Amendment of 1983, establishes a commercial
lending right for the copyright owners of sound recordings. S.32, 98th Cong., 1st Ses., 129
CoN. Rac. 8264-61 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983).
90. Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, The Thirteenth Donald C.
Brace Memorial Lecture (Apr. 13, 1983), reprinted in 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 421 (1983)
(hereinafter cited as Brace Memorial Lecture], and Ladd, Economic Harm: A Trojan Horse
in Copyright, Remarks before the American Bar Association (Aug. 10, 1982), reprintedin 24
PAT. T MzuAam
& COPlmGw' J. (BNA) 421 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Economic Harm].
91. Economic Harm, supra note 90, at 421. "Harm is not a separate element of the
tort of copyright infringement; to establish a copyright infringement case, one need only
prove ownership and copying.... Nonetheless, 'harm,' particularly palpable monetary
damage, has wrongfully intruded itself into the calculus of liability." Id.
92. Id. at 422. "The notion that 'economic harm' should serve as a basis for copyright
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on the copyright owner's opportunity to benefit fairly from the use
of their works will inevitably result in a society where creative endeavors involving high risk will not be pursued.'
The dissenting Justices were correct in questioning the Court's

approach to the doctrines of fair use and contributory infringement. The majority expanded the doctrine of fair use to include,
for the first time, an unproductive use. The Court then placed the
difficult and unnecessary burden of proving economic harm on the
copyright owner without indicating precisely how much harm is
now necessary in order to maintain an infringement action. With
regard to the issue of contributory infringement, the Court failed
to address the specific amount of noninfringing use that future
manufacturers must show in order to absolve themselves from liability. The Justices' reasoning regarding these doctrines undermines the philosophical rationale of the Copyright Act - to promote public access to numerous creative achievements by justly
rewarding the endeavors of copyright owners. The hope remains,
however, that Congress will soon re-examine these doctrines and
remove the uncertainty that now surrounds the protections afforded a copyright owner.'4
is bizarre: its application demands that creators demonstrate economic losses in order to
justify copyright." Id. at 421.
93. Brace Memorial Lecture, supra note 90, at 431. "By limiting potential rewards in
the copyright market. . . the entrepreneurial calculus which precedes risk-taking in authorship and publishing is shifted in the direction of not taking a chance, i.e., not writing or
publishing a 'risky' work, whether idealogically or economically risky." Id.
Today's motion picture industry is fraught with high risks. The average production
budget of a new feature film is over 8 million dollars and the distribution expenses can add
millions more to the total cost. Bloeser, Film and Video Tape Piracy:A Growing Epidemic,
reprinted in 1 SOFTWARE PROTECTION

AND MARKETING

(PLI) 547, 552 (1983). Currently, 6

out of 10 films do not break even on their investment. Only 2 out of 10 films are able to
recoup their investment from theatrical exhibitions alone. It is to the additional markets of
prerecorded cassettes and discs along with cable, network and syndicated television, to
which the filmmakers must look for survival. These markets are all highly susceptible to
VTR abuse. 129 CONG. REc. H198 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1983) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
The revenues diverted through VTR use will eventually result in losses to production companies and it could also adversly affect the future employment of the many individuals involved in the production and distribution of motion pictures. The ultimate loss, however,
will be imposed on society in the form of a restraint on future creative achievements.
94. The present administration has urged Congress in the past to adopt a wait-and-see
policy with regard to the home videotaping controversy. Schwartz, Reagan Administration
to Congress: Go Slowly on VTR Legislation, 28 ELECTRONIC NEWS supp I (July 12, 1982).
The imposition of an additional tax on consumers of VCR's and blank tapes is not an attractive issue in an election year. Representatives Don Edwards, the main sponsor of legislation to create a licensing scheme, and Robert W. Kastenmeier, whose panel has jurisdiction
over copyright law, both agree that Congress will not enact legislation to reverse the Court's
decision in the near future. N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1984, at 42, col. 5.
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The new technology in home entertainment is advancing at
such a rapid pace that it is difficult for the courts and Congress to
keep on top of the situation. After eight years of litigation, the
final determination of the issues presented by the Betamax controversy was long overdue. It is important to note that video tape
technology raises several significant issues that were not addressed
in the Betamax suit.e5 In addition, it is feared that as home videotaping increases it will have detrimental effects on the motion
picture and television industries which are not yet evident."
The Supreme Court's opinion correctly noted that "a difficult
balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries. . . and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and
commerce" must be achieved." The majority, however, proceeded
in its opinion to tip the scales towards favoring public access at the
expense of the copyright owner's right to protection. The opinion
is of great significance because it illustrates a departure from established legal doctrines and the plain language of the Constitutional mandate for copyright protection." The Court's unwillingness to protect copyright owners' rights, despite the presence of
95. The Court's decision did not specifically deal with the issue of librarying in which
the VTR user records a program to be saved for repeated viewings. Among the other issues
not addressed by the Betamax suit are: the later trading, rental, or sale of recorded cassettes
by a home user, the taping of programs from a cable television service; and, videotaping for
use outside of the home.
96. It has been suggested that advertisers may eventually lose interest in advertising
on television because the VTR's allow users to skip the commercials at a later viewing. In
addition, rating and viewing patterns may be disrupted by an increased use of the machines.
For example, commercials for holiday gift items broadcast in the winter will retain little
impact when viewed the following spring. Hollywood and the Home Videotapers, 70 NA'noNs Bus. 40 (1982).
The Court relied heavily on the district court's findings, that only 25 percent of VTR
owners fast forward through commercials, to conclude that practice of skipping commercials
is"too tedious" to present a threat to the commercial attractiveness of television. 104 S. Ct.
794 n.36. The most recent study of the taping habits of VTR users indicates that now 86.6
percent either skip or erase commercials. 129 CONG. Rzc. H198 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1983)
(statement of Rep. Edwards). Thus, apparently the practice of skipping commercials is no
longer the tedious task considered by the district court back in 1979.
Moreover, as the cost of VTR's continue to drop, it will soon be feasible for an individual to own two machines so that he can tape a friend's prerecorded tape to make an additional tape for himself. Speech by Bernard Sorkin of Warner Communications, University of
Miami Entertainment and Sports Law Society Symposium on The Making of a Motion Picture (Feb. 11, 1984).
97. 104 S. Ct. at 782.
98. Turn FwssALusr No. 43, at 294 (J. Madison) (Dunne ed. 1901). "The copyright of
authors has been solemnly adjudged... to be a right of common law.... The public good
fully coincides... with the claims of individuals." Id. See supra note 12.
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new technologies, suggests that our creative community is now to
be deprived of control over their works and, consequently, of their
incentive to pursue further achievements.
Deborah Magid
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